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How do price and entry regulations affect market structure, industry evolution,
management quality, and through these, dynamic efficiency? Relatively little is known about this
question. The literature on the effects of price and entry regulation on efficiency has shown
that such interventions can reduce static efficiency by preventing firms from allocating their
assets optimally. For example, trucking regulations prevented carriers from hauling regulated
commodities on return trips, making empty backhauls a serious problem. Airline regulations
increased costs by reducing load factors and by preventing airlines from routing optimally
(Morrison and Winston 1986). Lifting these regulation-induced production distortions led to
one-time improvements in efficiency. Data limitations, however, have limited work on the
effects of entry and price regulation on the evolution of industry costs over time (Winston
1993).
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In this paper, we find that the severe restrictions imposed on the geographic scope of
banks retarded the natural process of selection whereby better-managed, lower cost firms expand
at the expense of inefficient firms. Consequently, these restrictions raised the costs associated
with the average bank asset. The banking industry is a unique source of evidence on the dynamic
effects of entry regulation. First, banks were subjected to extremely severe entry barriers in the
form of branching restrictions at a relatively early stage of the industry’s development. Banks
have traditionally been prevented from crossing state lines and, until the 1980s, they were unable
1Among the few exceptions are Caves, et al (1981) who find that productivity in the
deregulated Canadian railroad industry grew much faster than in the regulated U.S. railways, and
Joskow (1981) who finds that rate and certificate-of-need regulation of hospitals slowed the
diffusion of CT scans.
1to cross county lines in many states. These restrictions have probably been binding since the
1890s, when banks began forming chain banks (banks commonly owned by a group of
individuals) as a means of getting around branching restrictions (Calomiris 1993)
2. These long-
standing restrictions have contributed to the extremely fragmented structure of the U. S. banking
industry, with thousands of banks and bank holding companies, a structure which contrasts
sharply with other countries where a few very large institutions dominate.
Second, geographic restrictions on banking have been gradually lifted over the past two
decades. Changes in banking once these restrictions are lifted allow us to understand the effects
of such restrictions. Moreover, because most branching restrictions were imposed by state
regulations, and because states deregulated at different times, we are able to use states which did
not change their policy regimes to control for potentially confounding effects such as the
business cycle. Pooling time series and cross sectional data also allows us to control for the
effects of unmeasured differences across states.
Existing literature on the effects of bank branching restrictions suggests that these
regulations limited banks’ ability to diversify portfolio risks (Calomiris 1993, Demsetz and
Strahan 1995) and increased market power (Rhoades 1982, Flannery 1984, Evanoff and Fortier
1988, Amel and Liang 1992).
2 The public debate in favor of geographic restrictions on banks was traditionally
dominated by political arguments about the dangers of excessive concentration of financial
power (Chapman and Westerfield 1942). But small, inefficient banks probably benefited from
the rents generated by these regulations. Economides et al (1996) find that the 1927 McFadden
Act, which imposed several restrictions on branching, was supported in Congress by
representatives from states with small, poorly capitalized banks.
2Less is known about the effects of branching restrictions on bank efficiency. The only
hypothesis on this topic with empirical support is that industry efficiency may have been
impaired by geographic restrictions because they vitiated corporate control markets by reducing
the number of potential acquirers, thereby worsening agency problems between bank owners and
managers. This may have contributed to increased costs and reduced profitability. Schranz
(1993) finds that banks in states with strict restrictions on geographic expansion are less
profitable than banks in states without such restrictions. Hubbard and Palia (1995) find increases
in both CEO turnover and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance after states allow
interstate banking. Hubbard and Palia interpret this as evidence of a more active takeover market
and better disciplined management in states with interstate banking. They offer no evidence,
however, that banks improved their performance following interstate banking.
In this paper, we find that banks’ efficiency improves sharply once restrictions on
intrastate branching are lifted and, to a lesser extent, after interstate banking is permitted. Loan
losses decrease by about 50 percent once statewide branching is permitted. Operating costs
decrease by about 8 percent after deregulation of branching restrictions.
We show that the observed efficiency improvement is not entirely the result of the timing
of deregulation. If states deregulate during economic downturns, then following deregulation
their banking systems may improve simply as a consequence of economic recovery. We account
for this potentially spurious correlation between bank performance and branching deregulation by
controlling for states’ business cycles in our regressions. Moreover, banks’ costs decrease
significantly after branching deregulation but not before, suggesting that causality flows from
3deregulation to improved performance rather than the reverse. (However, loan losses decline
before, as well as after, states allow interstate banking.)
Most of the reduced costs in banking after branch deregulation appear to have been
passed along to bank customers in the form of lower loan rates. Average loan rates fall by about 19
basis points in the short run and by 30 basis points in the long run (which amounts to about two-
thirds of the reduction in loan losses). As a result, we find only small, generally statistically
insignificant increases in bank profitability after deregulation. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that borrowers saved approximately $6 billion in 1992 as a result of lower
loan rates.
Much of the efficiency improvements appear to have occurred because branching
deregulation triggered a process of selection, whereby better-performing banks expanded at the
expense of high-cost, low-profit banks. Although better-performing banks grow faster than
under-achievers before intrastate branching is allowed, we find that low-cost, high-profit banks
grow even faster once branching restrictions are lifted. This suggests that branching restrictions
imposed binding constraints on the ability of better-managed banks to grow. Once these
restrictions were lifted, better banks expanded at the expense of their poorly-managed rivals,
thereby improving the efficiency of the average bank asset.
Although we make no direct estimates of the welfare gains from geographic deregulation
in banking, the evidence here allows educated guesswork about winners and losers. Bank
borrowers benefited from lower rates once limits on the geographic scope of banks were lifted.
Average bank profits did not decrease after deregulation (in fact, there is weak evidence of a
small increase in the average return on equity), but inefficient banks that were protected by
4stringent entry barriers probably lost profits and market share while efficient institutions gained.
But the welfare gains from the deregulation studied here probably extend beyond the banking
industry. By allowing inefficient banks to survive, geographic restrictions probably lowered the
quality of bank intermediation in the economy. The sharp drop in loan losses once statewide
branching was permitted suggests that banks screened and monitored borrowers better after
deregulation. The extensive literature on the importance of bank intermediation in reducing
financial market frictions and in improving the efficiency of capital markets implies that the real
economy may have benefited from bank deregulation. This conjecture is supported in Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), who find that states’ growth rates increased once branching restrictions were
removed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes the
legislative history of intrastate branching and interstate banking. Section III describes the
empirical methods and presents our estimates of improved banking efficiency and lower loan
rates. Section IV provides evidence on the process of selection that generated efficiency gains.
Section V concludes.
II. Recent history of interstate banking and intrastate branching
Interstate banking was effectively prohibited by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
The Douglas Amendment to that Act prohibited bank holding companies from establishing or
purchasing bank subsidiaries across state lines unless the target bank’s state authorized it. Since
no state allowed such transactions at the time, the 1956 Act prevented interstate banking. In
1978, Maine permitted out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to buy Maine banks. By
51992, the end of the sample period used in this paper, all states but Hawaii had entered an
interstate banking agreement with other states.
Interstate banking activity has increased sharply as a result of deregulation. The
percentage of deposits held by subsidiaries of out-of-state BHCs in the typical state expanded
from 2 to 28 percent between 1979 and 1994 (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995). Moreover,
banks appear to demand more from management following interstate banking: Hubbard and Palia
(1995) find a stronger pay-performance relation for CEOs and greater CEO turnover rates in
states with interstate banking.
In addition to prohibiting interstate banking, most states entered the 1970s with
restrictions on bank branching within state borders. For example, Florida prohibited branch
banking entirely until 1977, when banks were allowed to branch within the county where their
main offices were located. In 1988, Florida permitted branching statewide. Only 13 states
allowed unrestricted intrastate branching in 1974. During the next two and a half decades, 35
states and Washington, D.C. substantially eliminated restrictions on intrastate branching. By
1992, all but three states allowed some form of statewide branching.
Many states had allowed banking companies to expand within the state by forming multi-
bank holding companies (MBHCs) long before they allowed branch banking. If the MBHC
structure allowed banks to grow optimally without branching, we would expect branching to
have had little impact. MBHCs are more costly to operate than branch barks, however, because
they require multiple boards of directors and separate capitalization of each bank subsidiary. The
high cost of the MBHC structure is confirmed by the fact that many multibank holding
companies converted their bank subsidiaries into branches once branching was allowed
6(McLaughlin 1994). Other research also indicates that branch banking had important effects on
the structure of banking markets. Amel and Liang (1992) find significant entry into local
markets after intrastate branching restrictions are lifted via de novo branching.
finds that small banking companies lose market share after branching reform.
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Calem (1994)
Table 1 describes the history of the deregulation of restrictions on intrastate branching
and interstate banking since 1970.
4 The first column presents the year in which each state
permitted branching via merger and acquisition (M&A) through the holding company structure.
The second column presents the date at which each state first permitted interstate banking. The
dates chosen in Table 1 reflect the time at which each state finished the branching deregulation
process.
5 These choices in some cases require judgment, since some states deregulated gradually
over time. In four cases we chose dates earlier than the literal end of the process of deregulation
since we felt that the remaining restrictions no longer imposed a meaningful constraint on
branching.
6
3 Moore (1996) questions whether the decline in small banking companies is the result of
branching deregulation. He shows that the rate of decline in small banking company market
share does not accelerate after deregulation.
4 We exclude Delaware and South Dakota from our analysis because these two states
created incentives for credit card banks to locate there.
5 Dates for deregulation of both branching restrictions and restrictions on interstate
banking are taken from Amel (1993).
6 For instance, in 1982 Pennsylvania began permitting banks to branch in the home office
county, in a contiguous county, in a bicontiguous county or in the counties of Allegheny,
Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia. In 1990, Pennsylvania permitted unrestricted
branching statewide. In the results presented below, we assume that by 1982 Pennsylvania
permitted intrastate branching, despite the fact that the process was not finished until eight years
later, since the effect of the 1982 law brought Pennsylvania so close to complete intrastate branch
freedom. We follow a similar practice for the states of Ohio, Virginia and Washington. Our
7In addition to the two types of deregulation listed in Table 1, two more sets of geographic
restrictions were also lifted by states after 1970. The intrastate branching deregulation dates
listed in Table 1 are the dates when states allowed banks to expand statewide by acquiring
another bank’s branch or by acquiring a whole bank and converting it into branches (M&A
branching). However, de novo branching -- where a new branch is established -- was often
prohibited even after M&A branching was allowed. Typically, states allowed de novo branching
a few years after they allowed M&A branching. In this paper, we focus only on M&A
deregulation because de novo branching occurred too soon to separate out its effects from those
of M&A branching.
Another type of geographic restriction not examined here are the restrictions placed on
the BHC expansion within states. Illinois, for example, prohibited multi-bank holding
companies in 1957. However, most states did allow intrastate MBHC expansion. By 1975, the
beginning of our sample period, 35 states allowed MBHC expansion within each state. Of the
fifteen remaining states, all but Rhode Island relaxed MBHC restrictions between 1975 and 1992.
We do not examine intrastate MBHC deregulations partly because there were so few of them,
and partly because most of these states relaxed MBHC restrictions at about the same time as they
relaxed branching restrictions, making it difficult to separate the effects of MBHC deregulation.
III. Deregulation and bank performance
In this section we consider how deregulation affected producers and consumers in the
banking industry. First, we estimate changes after deregulation in two conventional indicators of
results are not sensitive to the alternative dating of deregulation in these four states.
8the well-being of firms: accounting measures of profitability and operating costs. Previous
studies of entry and price deregulation in other multifirm industries generally show that costs fall
following deregulation. By contrast, the evidence about the impact of deregulation on profits in
other industries is mixed. Trucking industry profits declined after deregulation while airline and
railroad profits increased (Winston 1993), suggesting that when the deregulated industry is highly
competitive (as it is in trucking), increased competition depresses profits more than the reduced
costs boost profits.
Second, we look at changes in loan losses following deregulation. This measure of
performance, unique to the banking industry, can be thought of as another component of costs
since loan losses directly reduce banks’ profits. Bank profits, for example, are reported net of
loan loss provisions. Moreover, loan losses are positively correlated with measures of
managerial inefficiency (X-inefficiency) derived from estimates of bank cost functions (Berger et
al 1996; Peristiani 1994). Yet another reason for paying attention to loan losses is that it is an
indicator of the quality of bank lending. Given the specialized role of banks as intermediaries
who ameliorate frictions in financial markets and thereby improve the functioning of capital
markets, improved bank intermediation increases the efficiency of the financial system and, in
turn, the rate of economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996.)
In the second part of this section, we estimate how prices (deposit and loan interest rates)
change after deregulation. Again, previous research has found that prices generally fall following
deregulation, leaving consumers better off (Winston 1993).
In our empirical analysis, we present estimates of changes in aggregate measures of
profits, costs (operating costs and loan losses), and prices following deregulation. We focus on
9state-level data here because, as we show later, deregulation enhances the natural tendency of
markets to weed out inefficient firms. By constructing a balanced panel of state-level aggregates,
we avoid selection and survivorship problems that would bias tests based on data from individual
banks. Changes in aggregate data on the banking industry as a whole will capture the impact of
any selection process, as well as other effects, following deregulation. In Section IV, we use
bank-level data to demonstrate the importance of selection effects following deregulation.
A. Profits and Costs
We measure profitability by return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and
return on equity (net income divided by book value of equity). Net income, assets and book
value of equity are aggregated to the state level by summing across all commercial banks
operating in a given state. The dependent variable equals the total net income of all banks in a
state divided by the total assets (or equity) of all banks in that state. The result is the weighted
average of bank profitability. (For example, the return on assets variable used here is the asset-
weighted average return on assets of individual banks.) The profitability data are taken from
year-end Quarterly Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports) for 1975 to 1992.
We measure operating costs using the log of total non-interest expenses. Again, we
construct a state-level aggregate by summing total non-interest expenses for all banks operating
in a given state. These data are available from the Call Reports beginning in 1984.
For loan losses, we consider a contemporaneous as well as a backward-looking and
forward-looking measure of the health of the loan portfolio. The fraction of total loans classified
10as “non-performing” provides a snapshot of the current health of the loan portfolio.
7 End-of-year
non-performing loan amounts for all banks over the 1982 to 1992 period are taken from Call
Reports. A state-level aggregate non-performing loan amount is derived by summing over all
banks in each state. The variable of interest is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans
held by all banks in each state. Our second, more backward-looking loan loss variable is the
fraction of loans written off during the year. This variable, net charge-offs (gross charge-offs less
recoveries), reflects realizations of losses on loans made in the past and are again taken from
end-of-year Call Reports over the 1976-1992 period. State-level net charge-offs are derived, and
the dependent variable is the ratio of charge-offs to total loans. Finally, we use loan loss
provisions to total loans as a forward-looking measure of loan quality. Loan loss provisions are
intended to measure banks’ expected losses on the current loan portfolio.
We use the dates reported in Table 1 to construct two indicator variables equal to 1 for
states permitting branching and interstate banking. We use these indicator variables to estimate
the effects of the policy changes in the following fixed effects model:
income.
7 All loans 90 days or more past due and nonaccrual loans are classified as non-
performing loans.
11measures the national business cycle at time t; PIG removes the effects of the local (i.e. state-
types of deregulation.
9 The lags of the dependent variable are included to control for cyclical
movements in the dependent variable beyond those captured by the national and local business
cycle. Note that by including these lags, the coefficients on the deregulation indicators measure
the initial effect of deregulation on the dependent variable. As we will see, the long-run effects
are generally larger.
10
The results of the basic models outlined above appear in Table 2. As shown in the first
two columns, profits increase slightly following branching deregulation, although the change in
return on assets is not statistically significant at conventional levels and the rise in return on
8 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that the rate of economic growth increases after
branching deregulation, probably because the quality of bank intermediation improves after
deregulation (as reflected in the lower levels of bad loans). In that event, the economic growth
rate is endogenous in the empirical model above. Nevertheless, we include PIG as a regressor
because we want to control for the possibility that states may have deregulated during a trough of
the state business cycle (as discussed later). However, all results presented hereafter remain
unchanged if we were to drop PIG from the regressions.
9 In constructing the deregulation indicators, we drop the year in which the deregulation
went into effect. We also drop Delaware and South Dakota from the analysis entirely. These
two states liberalized their usury laws to encourage credit card banks to operate there.
10 Since we include two lags of the dependent variable, we lose data at the beginning of
the period for operating costs, non-performing loans and charge-offs. Since non-performing
loans and operating costs are only available from 1982 and 1984 onward, this loss of data
reduces the power of our tests dramatically, since the fixed effects estimator is driven by changes
in each state’s regulatory status. To allow us to preserve the data all the way back to 1982 (1984)
for these two variables, we construct an instrument for the lagged dependent variable. For non-
performing loans, the instrument is constructed from loan charge-offs and provisions; for
operating costs the instrument is constructed from expenses on salaries and fixed assets.
12equity is only significant at the 10 percent level. Following interstate banking, return on equity
and return on assets also rise, but again the increases are not statistically significant.
Column three of Table 2 presents the results of the operating cost regression. Here, we
find a statistically significant decline in total non-interest expenses following both deregulation
of branching restrictions and again following deregulation of interstate banking. Non-interest
expenses consist of salaries, expenses on fixed assets (e.g. rent) and other non-interest expenses.
Looking at these components separately, we find that salaries per worker decline while the total
number of workers rises after deregulation, leaving total salary expenses roughly unchanged.
Thus, banks seem to be able to hire more workers after deregulation for the same total cost.
Although we find no change in expenses on fixed assets, other non-interest expenses fall
significantly after deregulation.
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The last three columns present the changes in bank loan performance. Like operating
costs, all three measures of loan losses decrease following branch deregulation. We do see small
declines in non-performing loans and loan loss provisions after interstate banking deregulation,
but these declines are not statistically significant.
The improvements in loan losses, along with the declines in operating costs, suggest that
banks are, on average, operating more efficiently following deregulation. These estimated
improvements are economically, as well as statistically, large. For instance, the average decline
in loan loss provisions following branching deregulation during our sample period is 0.48
11The “other non-interest” expenses category includes amortization of intangible assets
such as goodwill, losses on real estate owned, losses on sales of loans and fixed assets, fees paid
to directors, insurance premia, legal fees, marketing and advertising costs, and other non-interest
costs.
13percent, or about half of the unconditional mean. (This estimate is based on the coefficient on
the deregulation indicator that we observe when we drop the lags of the dependent variable from
the specification in Table 2.) Based on this estimate, had all states imposed branching
restrictions in 1992 (when all but three states allowed statewide branching), loan loss provisions
would have been about $9 billion higher than if no state had restricted branching (0.0048 * total
loans in 1992 ($1.9 trillion)).
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Similarly, operating costs fall by 8.3 percent after deregulation in the model without lags
of the dependent variable. Multiplying this by total non-interest expenses incurred by all banks
operating in 1992 suggests operating costs would have been approximately $9.8 billion per year
higher if all states disallowed statewide branching in 1992.
B. Prices
Table 3 provides estimates of changes in deposit and loan prices following deregulation
using the same empirical method outlined above. In particular, we construct state-level aggregate
measures of prices and then estimate the changes in those prices following deregulation in a
model with state and time fixed effects, controls for state-level business cycles, and lags of the
dependent variable.
Our measure of deposit price is the average interest rate, net of fees, paid on small,
domestic deposits. This variable equals total interest expenses on domestic deposits under
$100,000 minus income from deposit fees divided by total domestic deposits under $100,000.
These data are available for all banks on the Call Reports from 1976 to 1992.
12 This calculation is actually an upper bound on the decline in loan losses since we are
using total loans in 1992, when all states but three had deregulated their branching restrictions.
14For loan prices, we construct the average yield on all loans by dividing total interest
income on loans and leases by total loans and leases, again aggregated up to the state level.
These data are also available for all banks on the Call Reports from 1976 to 1992.
As reported in Table 3, loan prices fall significantly following branching deregulation.
The coefficient on the branching deregulation indicator is negative and statistically significant at
the five percent level. The model without lags of the dependent variable suggests declines of
about 0.3 percentage points following branching deregulation. Note that this decline is about
two-thirds of the decline in loan loss provisions, suggesting that most of the reductions in loan
losses are passed along to banks’ borrowers. Multiplying the loan price reduction by total loans
outstanding as of 1992 yields a rough estimate of the gains to borrowers of about $6 billion per
year.
13,14
We do not, however, find increases in deposits interest rates following branching
deregulation. On the other hand, these rates do increase following interstate banking
deregulation. As we will see below, however, the observed increase occurs because deposit
interest rates are unusually low just before states enter interstate banking agreements.
13 Unless loan demand is perfectly price inelastic, the $6 billion is an over-estimate of the
increase in consumer surplus.
14 Since banks’ costs and loan rates decline after statewide branching, we would expect
the volume of loans to increase after deregulation.  Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that the
rate of growth of bank lending increases after branching deregulation in larger states (but no
change is observed in smaller states).
15C. Robustness Tests
Omitted variables
The reduced-form regressions in Tables 2 and 3 tell us the total effects of deregulation on
costs and prices. But the output mix of banks may have changed as a consequence of changes in
costs. For instance, if loan losses on one class of loans fell by more than another class of loans,
and if that loss reduction were passed along to borrowers, then we would expect to observe an
increase in the share of the class of loans experiencing the larger reduction in loan losses
following deregulation. If, as a consequence, the output mix shifted toward safer loans, then our
estimates of the changes in loan losses in Table 2 would be biased downward (away from zero).
That is, the decrease in loan losses observed in Table 2 may be due to banks making safer loans
and not due to banks screening and monitoring borrowers better. And loan yields may have
decreased because of safer lending by banks and not because of competitive pressure to pass
along to consumers reduced costs associated with loan losses. Similarly, operating costs may
have declined because bank output (loans and deposits) may have decreased.
To account for this possibility, Table 4 reports the results of the operating cost, loan
losses and loan pricing regressions controlling for the output mix. In the operating cost
regression, we control for bank “output” by including the log of small deposits, and the log of
total credit card loans, commercial loans (commercial and industrial loans plus commercial real
estate loans) and other loans. In the loan losses and loan pricing regressions, we control for the
riskiness of the loan portfolio by including the fraction of total loans in credit cards and in
16commercial loans, the two riskiest categories of loans.
15 In each of the five cases, we find that
the improvements in costs and reductions in loan losses and loan prices remain statistically
significant even after controlling for the output mix. We also find no decrease in the two risky
loan categories, credit cards and commercial loans, following branch deregulation, suggesting
that banks did not shift to safer loans after deregulation. Evidently, safer lending is not
responsible for decreased loan losses and loan rates after deregulation, and reduced bank output
is not responsible for lower operating costs after statewide branching.
Of course, it is possible that within each category of loans, banks are making safer loans
after deregulation. So, although banks are not making fewer C&I loans and credit card loans
after deregulation, perhaps they are making safer C&I loans and credit card loans. This is
unlikely, since Keeley (1990) shows that banks increased their risk taking after geographic
deregulation because eliminating entry barriers reduced banks’ franchise value (as measured by
Tobin’s Q--probably due to reduced market power). Moreover, in Section IV of this paper we
show that banks with fewer loan losses grew faster than banks with more loan losses once
branching was permitted. Thus, the change in loan losses reflects not the inherent riskiness of
the borrowers but the improved quality of the banking system’s screening and monitoring of
borrowers.
15 Ideally, one would like to measure changes in loan losses and prices for each of banks’
major category of loans (commercial, credit card and real estate). Unfortunately, charge-offs are
only available by loan type beginning in 1984 and non-performing loans by loan type beginning
in 1987. Loan loss provisions are not collected by loan type. Interest income on loans is
available by loan type back to 1984. We found, however, that these data are less reliable than the
total interest income on all loans and leases.
17Are cost and price declines widespread?
We have also checked to see whether our results are driven by changes in costs or prices
in any one particular state. In fact, we find the improvements after branching deregulation to be a
general phenomenon. For instance, in all but one of the deregulating states (New Hampshire),
loan losses decline after branching deregulation relative to states which did not deregulate.
Similarly, we find that loan prices improve in deregulating states, again relative to non-
deregulators, in two-thirds of the cases. Again, we find that New Hampshire is a significant
outlier. It turns out that New Hampshire deregulated its branching restrictions just prior to the
New England banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a consequence, loan losses
and loan yields were substantially above the national average in New Hampshire just after
branching deregulation.
This robustness is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Here, we look separately at each
deregulating state by comparing the change in its average loan loss provisions to total loans
ratio (Figure 1) and the change in its average loan yield (Figure 2) with the corresponding
change for a control group of states over the same period. Each of the deregulators appears as
a pair of points on the graph: for instance, the state’s two-letter postal code name indicates the
change in loan losses in that state (the “treatment state”) following deregulation; a diamond
appears directly above (or below) the state name indicating the change over the same period for
all states which did not alter their regulatory regime during this period (the “control group”).
For example, in Figure 1 Oklahoma (represented as “OK” in the bottom left corner) is
recorded as having decreased its mean
1988 by about 0.75 percentage points.
loan loss provisions ratio following branching reform in
The associated diamond above OK indicates that all
18states which did not change policy in 1988 experienced an increase in loan loss provisions of
about 0.75 percentage points over the same period.
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The timing of deregulation
Another possible explanation for the observed reductions in costs and loan losses
following branching deregulation is that states deregulated when their economies were doing
poorly. Following deregulation, banks’ loan portfolios may improve as the economies recover
from the trough of the business cycle. The timing of the policy change may create a spurious
association between branching deregulation and measures of profits and loan losses.
17 This
possibility is suggested by the fact that 25 of the 35 states that deregulated their branching
restrictions during the sample period changed policy after 1984, the first of many years of
dramatically increased bank failure rates.
18 It is possible that, confronted with a severe negative
shock to the economy and to the banking system, small banks -- the traditional constituency for
branching restrictions -- dropped their opposition to branching in order to find higher purchase
prices when exiting the distressed banking industry. Regulators may have pushed for liberalized
branching to increase bank consolidation and to weed out weaker banks.
19
16Figures for charge-offs and non-performing loans look similar to Figure 1.
17We are grateful to Charles Calomiris and to Stavros Peristiani for suggesting this
possibility.
181296 banks were subject to FDIC intervention over the nine year interval between 1984
and 1992. In contrast, a mere 25 banks failed over the nine years prior to 1984 [FDIC 1993].
19Kane (1996) cites increased failure rates among financial institutions in the 1980s as a
reason for the wave of geographic deregulation during that decade.
19Another explanation for the observed improvements in bank performance following
branching is that state legislatures anticipated significant growth in the states’ economies and
deregulated their banking systems so that banks were better able to fund attractive investment
projects.
Neither of these explanations of the improved bank performance is plausible. By
including personal income growth and lags of the dependent variable in our regression, we have
controlled explicitly for state-specific business cycles as well as cycles in the banking sector.
The estimated effect of branching and interstate banking on bank performance is not biased by
any correlation between these deregulations and the business cycle. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
show that states were just as likely to deregulate branching restrictions during the downswing of
the business cycle as during the upswing.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the observed performance changes are the result of some
external financial sector innovations not adequately captured by the personal income growth
variable that both raised the cost of these geographical restrictions (and therefore raised the
likelihood of their removal) and led to improved bank lending. To account for this possibility,
we look to the timing of the changes associated with deregulation by adding an indicator variable
during the five-year window before branching deregulation and another indicator during the five-
year window before interstate banking deregulation. In the operating cost and loan losses
regressions, we find that the coefficient on the pre-branching indicator is not statistically
significant. In the loan pricing regressions, although we find a significant increase in loan prices
during the five-year window before deregulation, this increase is driven by the unusual
circumstances of North Dakota, whose economy experienced
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extreme volatility just prior to itsderegulation of branching. When we drop North Dakota, the pre-branching indicator is not
significant in the loan pricing model.
On the other hand, we do find significant improvements in non-performing loans, charge-
offs and loan loss provisions both five years before as well as after interstate banking
deregulation. Similarly, we find that deposit interest rates are unusually low just prior to interstate
banking deregulation (i.e., the coefficient on the pre-interstate banking indicator is negative and
significant in the deposit pricing regression). This may mean that states prefer to enter interstate
banking agreements when their banks are particularly healthy (strong supply of deposits, low
loan losses) and therefore well-positioned to be taken over at a high price.
20 On the other hand,
banks may anticipate deregulation and change their behavior in advance, perhaps because bank
managers recognize an increased threat of takeover.
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We conclude that the observed improvements in bank efficiency after branch deregulation
was not due to the timing of that deregulation. While we also find important changes associated
with interstate banking deregulation, we can not be sure how much of those changes should be
attributed to the timing of deregulation and how much should be attributed to the beneficial
effects of the deregulation itself. We therefore focus exclusively on branching deregulation in
the next section, where we use banking company level data to explore why costs and prices fall
following deregulation.
20To the extent that banks’ balance sheets are less opaque during good times, acquirors
will be willing to pay more to purchase banks than during bad times. That is, the “lemons
problems” resulting from private information about the true value of bank loans may be least
severe during good times.
21These results are omitted for brevity but are available on request. We also estimated
these models with 3-year windows instead of 5-year windows and got similar results.
21IV. How did branching deregulation improve bank performance?
We have shown that loan losses and operating costs fall dramatically following intrastate
branch deregulation. All of the benefits occur after deregulation, not before, suggesting that the
branching policy change helped improve banking. Most of the decrease in costs appear to have
been passed along to bank borrowers in the form of lower loan rates, leaving bank customers
better off after deregulation.
Why did banks perform better after branching was permitted? In this section we argue
that most of this improvement occurred because deregulation allowed better-performing banks to
grow relatively faster. In other words, branching restrictions reduced the performance of the
average bank asset because they constrained the growth opportunities of better-run banks. In the
remainder of this section, we test (and confirm) two implications of this selection hypothesis.
First, we show that bank assets were substantially redistributed following branching deregulation
as better-run banks increase their share of bank assets. Second, we show that the changes in the
size distribution favored the ex ante better-run banks.
Of course, there may be other reasons for the observed improvement in bank performance
following geographic deregulation. Limits to branching and mergers and acquisitions across
state lines may have exacerbated owner-manager agency problems both by reducing the threat of
a takeover and by limiting competition. Managers of banks in regulated states may invest in
negative net-present value projects, either because they exert less effort in loan screening and
monitoring or because they earn utility from some unproductive loans. After deregulation, these
managers may be forced to increase shareholder value either to avoid takeovers or to protect
22against the loss of market share to more efficient competitors. The banking system improves
because managerial effort increases for all banks. This conjecture is supported by Hubbard and
Palia (1995) who find that banks’ CEO turnover increases and pay-performance relation tightens
once states allow interstate banking.
To directly test this “disciplining conjecture,” we require measures of the extent of the
owner-manager agency problems. The disciplining hypothesis would be strongly supported if
measures of agency costs improve for most banks after deregulation, and if those banks with the
greatest management slack prior to deregulation improve performance the most after
deregulation. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable indicators of managerial slack. Absent
such data, we focus on testing the selection hypothesis.
22 Although it is possible that greater
managerial discipline may account for some of the observed increase in banks’ efficiency, we
find that selection accounts for most of the improvements noted before in Table 2.
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Average bank efficiency may also have increased following deregulation because
constraints on geographical expansion prevented banks from operating at the optimal scale. We
discount this possibility, however, for three reasons. First, there is scant evidence of scale
22Prowse (1995) casts some doubt on the importance of bank takeover activity in
disciplining bank managers. He finds that hostile takeovers almost never occur in banking, in
sharp contrast to their frequency in nonfinancial industries. It seems reasonable that the threat of
takeover can only discipline management effectively if some hostile takeovers actually take
place.
23Both the selection and disciplining hypotheses imply that the variability of performance
across banks should diminish following deregulation. Fewer high cost banks should be able to
survive following deregulation, hence lowering cross-bank variability (selection). Moreover,
banks with more severe management/shareholder agency problems should improve performance
more than banks with less severe agency problems, again lowering variability (disciplining). We
find that the cross-sectional variability in almost all the performance measures reported in
Table 2 decreases after branching.
23economies in banking, at least for banks with total assets above $500 million (see Berger, Hunter
and Timme, 1993). It is implausible that the large improvements that we have found in the state-
level aggregates could be explained by inefficiently small banks moving closer to the optimal
scale. In 1980, for instance, banks with under $500 million in assets (in 1994 dollars) held less
than 30 percent of total assets in the banking system. Second, although the market share of small
banks has fallen over the past two decades, thousands of small banks remain in operation. Third,
we have estimated the change in our performance measures following branching deregulation for
small (banks with assets under $100 million) and large banks separately in the same fixed effects
model of Table 2 (not shown). We find that the improvements are larger for large banks than for
small, a finding inconsistent with the economies of scale explanation.
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A. The Bank Size Distribution Changes after Deregulation
Table 5 confirms that there was a large redistribution of bank assets after statewide
branching was permitted. The first column of that table shows that the log of the state-level
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of bank deposit concentration increased after branching.
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The model without lags of the dependent variable suggests a long-run increase in the HHI of
close to 30 percent.
26 In contrast to branching deregulation, state-level bank concentration
24These results are available on request.
25The state-level HHI is calculated by first estimating the share of statewide bank
deposits held by each banking company, and then squaring and summing these shares. The
resulting number ranges from 0 (when each firm holds a minute fraction of statewide bank
assets) to 10,000 (a monopoly).
26Results available on request.
24decreased once interstate banking was allowed, perhaps because of the entry of out-of-state
banking companies.
The increase in the HHI suggests that banking assets were more concentrated after
branching. At least part of this increased concentration is due to small banks losing market share
(column 2, Table 5). Banks with less than $100 million in assets lost about 3.5 percentage
points in their share of statewide banking assets based on the model without lags of the
dependent variable. This represents about a 17 percent decline in the typical state’s small bank
share.
Finally, the redistribution of bank assets after branching was not driven by increased
takeover activity. In column 3 of Table 5 the dependent variable is the percentage of bank assets
that change hands each year in each state between 1975 and 1992. The “acquisition rate” is the
total dollar value of assets in banking companies acquired in a given year in a given state, divided
by total assets in that state at the beginning of the year. Only those transactions that involve a
genuine change of corporate control are included.
27 We find that takeover rates increased after
interstate banking was deregulated but not after branching was permitted.
28 This suggests that
27We do not include acquisitions that required FDIC assistance. Nor do we include
mergers and acquisitions that arise from corporate reorganizations, which involve no change in
the control of banking assets. For example, mergers among banks held by the same bank holding
company are not included. The takeover data are taken from Rhoades (1986) and Rhoades
(1996). We thank Stephen Rhoades for providing us this information.
28We also estimated the model in column 3, Table 5 with 3-year and 5-year windows
after deregulation and find no increase in takeover rates in the year immediately after branching
deregulation.
25some banks grew following branching deregulation through internally generated growth (e.g. de
novo branching) or through branch purchases.
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B. Deregulation Enhances the Growth of Efficient Banks
Thus far we have shown that there was a substantial redistribution of bank assets after
deregulation of statewide branching, consistent with the selection hypothesis. A second
implication of the selection hypothesis is that better-run banks should be the beneficiaries of this
asset redistribution because they grow faster than poorly-run banks after deregulation. We test
this implication by using profitability and loan losses of individual banks as “noisy” indicators of
management quality, and then asking whether banks with high profits and few bad loans before
deregulation grew relatively faster after branching deregulation.
To test this implication of the selection hypothesis, we rely on banking company-level
data in the remainder of this section.
30 The statewide aggregate data used in the previous section
captured the combined effects of all changes in the banking system that may have affected bank
performance following deregulation, possibly including changes in managerial discipline and
reduced scale inefficiencies as well as improved selection. In contrast, banking company-level
29Banks may find it cheaper to expand by buying branches rather than buying entire
banks for at least two reasons. First, if banks have private information about some of their assets,
the market for these assets will be characterized by a “lemons” problem. Branch purchases allow
the buyer to pick and choose assets that are easier to value and hence suffer less from lemons
problems. In contrast, bank purchases require the buyer to take on the entire asset portfolio of
the target, more- as well as less-transparent assets. Second, the costs associated with regulatory
approval of branch purchases are probably less than the regulatory costs of bank purchases.
30A banking company is defined here to be the combined balance sheet of all commonly-
owned banks. However, if a bank holding company operates in multiple states, then its
subsidiaries in each state are grouped together as a separate entity. (This is necessary because
states deregulated at different times.)
26data allow us to distinguish the effects of selection from other possible sources of bank
performance improvements.
For each state, we construct the return on equity, return on assets, and the ratios of
charge-off, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans to loans for all banking companies
(independent banks and bank holding companies) operating in the state during three years: the
year just prior to branching deregulation, the seventh year prior to deregulation and the fifth year
after deregulation. We then compute asset growth rates from the seventh year before
deregulation to one year prior to deregulation and from the year prior to deregulation to five years
after deregulation. In other words, we have two windows, a six-year window before branching
deregulation and another six-year window after deregulation.
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Table 6 tests whether ex ante better-performing banks grow faster once branching is
allowed. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of each banking company’s assets
over the two six-year windows constructed as described before.
32 The independent variables of
interest are ex ante performance measures. We interact the performance measures with an
31We chose these window lengths because most of the observed changes in bank
structure occurred within five years after branching deregulation. For example, nearly two-
thirds of the 30 percent increase in the state-level bank asset concentration (the HHI) occurred
within five years after branching deregulation. Similar results are reported in Berger, Kashyap
and Scalise (1995) who find that most changes to bank structure occur within five years after
geographic deregulation. (Some states entered interstate banking agreements during the five-year
window. For these states, we use the year just prior to the year in which the state entered the
interstate banking agreement as the end of the window. We dropped four states that entered
interstate banking agreements in the same year or one year after branching was deregulated (WV,
TN, OR and NH).)
32We have also estimated the model in Table 6 using the growth rate of each banking
company’s assets relative to the average growth rate of assets in the same state and over the same
period. These results are very similar to those presented in Table 6 and are available on request.
27indicator equal to one during the deregulated period to test whether deregulation enhanced
selection -- if it did, we should see ex ante performance measures acting as better predictors of
future growth after deregulation. The model is estimated on the pooled data set with a bank-
specific fixed effects. We also control for bank size, since large banks may be expected to grow
relatively slowly, and capital, since regulatory capital adequacy standards may constrain growth.
Our performance measures are based on a bank’s position relative to its peers.
33 High
performers are those banks that are above the median in return on assets or return on equity, or
below the median in net charge-offs, loan loss provisions or non-performing loans.
34 This
procedure yields a “discrete performance measure.” A second, “continuous performance
measure” was constructed by taking the difference between each bank’s profitability (loan losses)
and the profitability (loan losses) of the average bank in that state in that year, divided by the
standard deviation of bank profitability in that state and year.
Table 6 shows that banks that had higher profits and fewer loan losses in the year before
branching was allowed subsequently grew faster than initially poorer-performing banks. For
example, a banking company with return on assets one standard deviation above average grew
0.79 percentage points faster per year than an average performer (column 1). Banking companies
with above-median return on assets grew 1.46 percentage points faster than banks with below-
33We do not include operating costs in this analysis, however, since total non-interest
expenses are only available beginning in 1984. As a result, the analysis in Table 6 could have
been done for banks in only three states for this variable.
34The median performance measures are conditional on year and state. For example, a
bank in Alabama would be classified as an above-median ROE bank in 1980 if its ROE is above
the median ROE in Alabama in 1980. This approach removes the effects of inflation and state-
specific factors on profitability.
28median return on assets after branching was allowed (column 2). The other ex ante performance
measures also predict growth after branching deregulation. This is consistent with the selection
hypothesis. By contrast, we find no significant relationship between ex ante performance and
growth during the regulated period.
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The results in Table 6 supports the selection hypothesis by showing that the average bank
that grew after branching deregulation was a high-profit bank with lower than average loan
losses.
36 To what extent can this selection process explain the improvements in aggregate, state-
level banking performance observed in Table 2? For example, Table 2 shows that the asset-
weighted average of bank loan loss provisions decreased by 48 basis points after statewide
branching was permitted (based on the model without lags of the dependent variable). What
fraction of this improvement can be explained by the selection process? Although we have
shown (in Table 6) that on average better performing banks grew relatively faster after branching
35The positive correlation between initial bank profitability and subsequent asset growth
may be due to the fact that banks facing better loan demand and investment opportunities are
likely to show superior performance and faster growth. If the positive correlation between initial
bank performance and subsequent bank growth is purely due to local demand conditions, then
initial bank performance should predict subsequent bank growth before deregulation as well as
after deregulation. Assuming that this “bias” remains constant over time, any additional growth-
performance correlation after deregulation may be attributed to increased selection once
branching is permitted. Table 6 shows that prior to branching, there was no statistically
significant relation between initial bank performance and subsequent asset growth. This suggests
that the positive correlation between performance and asset growth after branching is due to
selection.
36The results in Table 6 are based only on banking companies that survive to the end of
the period. We have also estimated the same model with banks which do not survive by coding
their end-of-period assets as zero and using the corresponding annual asset growth rate as the
dependent variable. (In this specification, we use the simple asset growth rate since the
continuously compounded, annual growth rate is undefined for banks whose assets reach zero).
When we include these non-surviving banks, we find that the coefficient on ex-ante performance
is larger (in absolute value) than when these non-survivors are excluded.
29deregulation, we have not shown that most of the redistribution of assets after branching
deregulation was towards relatively better performing banking companies. The results in Table
6 do not rule out the possibility that a few, large, poorly-performing banks increased their share
of bank assets the most. If this were true, then selection may account for little of the post-
deregulation efficiency improvements.
To quantify the effects of selection on loan losses (and thereby to further test the selection
conjecture) we conduct a simulation exercise in Table 7. The premise of the exercise is as
follows: Table 2 shows that the asset-weighted average bank efficiency improves following
branching deregulation. If the selection hypothesis is correct, then most of this improvement is
due to more efficient banks expanding their assets and thereby receiving more weight in the
asset-weighted average. If only selection is at work once branching is allowed, then the
redistribution of assets from high cost banks to low cost banks would account for the entire
reduction in the asset-weighted average performance measures.
The simulation exercise in Table 7 tests this implication of the selection hypothesis as
follows: first, we calculate the asset-weighted average (across banking companies) of one of our
performance measures -- say, loan loss provisions -- in the year before deregulation. Next we
compare that with the average when the asset weights are based on the distribution of assets
observed five years after deregulation. If, as the selection hypothesis predicts, most of the
redistribution of bank assets after branching deregulation goes from inefficient banks towards
efficient banks, then the asset-weighted average loan losses based on bank sizes observed five
30years after deregulation should be less than the asset-weighted loan losses based on bank sizes
observed the year before deregulation.
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This prediction of the selection conjecture is confirmed in Table 7. The asset-weighted
average loan loss provisions in the year before deregulation was 1.32 percent (column 3, Table
7). Based on the asset distribution observed five years later (but holding the banks’ loan loss
provisions at their pre-deregulation levels), the average decreases to 0.90 percent (column 4,
Table 7). Of course, this improvement need not be entirely due to the faster growth of more
efficient banks. Instead, it may be due to the relatively faster growth of banks fortunate enough
to be in robust local economies. To account for this possibility, we conduct the same re-
weighing exercise as above for the six-year window prior to branching deregulation (columns 1
and 2, Table 7). There we find that although the reweighted loan loss provisions average is
smaller, the decrease is less than that observed for the period after deregulation (the decrease is
from 0.59 percent to 0.49 percent). Using a difference-in-differences approach, these estimates
suggest that selection effects could account for a decrease of 0.32 percentage points ([1.32-0.9]-
[0.59-0.49]). That is, about two-thirds of the 48 basis point drop in loan loss provisions (in the
model without lags) may be explained by the redistribution of bank assets from less efficient to
more efficient banks. Similarly, about half of the decrease in net charge-offs and three-quarters
37The banking company loan loss provisions are held constant at their levels as of the
year before deregulation. This way, we hold constant other factors (such as managerial
disciplining) that may have improved performance following deregulation.
31of the decrease in non-performing loans (again, in the model without lags) can be explained in
terms of selection.
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It is noteworthy that the simulation exercise in Table 7 suggests that not only did much of
the asset redistribution after branching favor banking companies with relatively low loan losses,
but also that the redistribution favors initially high-profit banks. And yet we do not see a strong
increase in asset-weighted profitability after deregulation (Table 2). The reason may be that
assets are redistributed after deregulation because of greater competition among banks (suggested
by decreased loan rates) that also decreases profits across the board.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we find evidence that long-standing branching restrictions in banking
served as entry barriers that prevented more efficient banks from expanding at the expense of
their less efficient rivals. By retarding the “natural” evolution of the industry, such
restrictions reduced the efficiency of the average banking asset. Once branching restrictions
were lifted, the efficiency of the banking system improved, and bank borrowers benefited from
lower loan rates.
Restrictions on interstate banking may have had similar effects. Indeed, we find
substantial reductions in loan losses and operating costs after interstate banking is permitted, as
38These results are based on data pooled across all states. We have also done these
simulations for each state separately and found similar results. For instance, in 20 out of 31
cases, we find that re-weighting the average return on equity based on the size distribution five
years after deregulation leads to an increase in this average, as predicted by the selection
hypothesis.
32we did after states allowed statewide branching. At least part of the improved bank
performance associated with interstate bank deregulation, however, is probably due to the
timing of such deregulation since, in contrast to branching, we observe efficiency
improvements before as well as after interstate banking.
Reduced loan losses in the banking system following branch deregulation may have
implications beyond increased profits to banks and decreased loan rates to bank borrowers. To
the extent that loan losses decrease because banks improve their monitoring and screening of
their borrowers (and we have shown that loan losses did not shrink because banks made safer
loans after deregulation), then branch deregulation may have helped improve the quality of
bank intermediation. The extensive literature on the importance of banks in producing
information suggests that improved bank intermediation would have improved efficiency of
capital markets in allocating resources to the highest return investments. This is supported in
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) who find that the positive shock to the banking system that
occurred with branching deregulation significantly increased the growth rate of states’
economies for at least ten years.
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